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ARE FAMILY-FRIENDLY WORKPLACE PRACTICES A
VALUABLE FIRM RESOURCE?
NICK BLOOM,1 TOBIAS KRETSCHMER,2* and JOHN VAN REENEN3
1 Stanford University, Department of Economics, Stanford, California, U.S.A.
2 University of Munich, Department of Management, Munich, Germany
3 Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, London, U.K.
We study the determinants and consequences of family-friendly workplace practices (FFWP)
using a sample of over 450 manufacturing firms in Germany, France, U.K., and U.S. We find a
positive correlation between firm productivity and FFWP. This association disappears, however,
once we control for a measure of the quality of management practices. We further find that
firms with a higher proportion of female managers and more skilled workers, as well as well-
managed firms, tend to implement more FFWP. Conversely, a firm’s environment does not have a
significant impact on the FFWP it provides.© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal
published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Strategists’ key interest is in studying the perfor-
mance impact of (strategic) firm actions. Recently,
actions aimed at leveraging and securing firm
resources have been intensively studied. Actions
were measured against their ability to make a
resource valuable, rare, and/or inimitable (Bar-
ney, 1991). Human capital is often considered a
potential firm resource (Pfeffer, 1994; Koch and
McGrath, 1996; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Lee
and Miller, 1999), sparking intense interest among
strategy scholars in the performance effects of
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(strategic) human resource management (SHRM)
(Cappelli and Singh, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Ulrich,
1991; Wright and McMahan, 1992; Huselid, 1995;
Fey, Bjo¨rkman, and Pavlovskaya, 2000; Batt, 2002).
Some empirical studies of SHRM forge links
to the specific elements of a VRIO framework
(resources must be valuable, rare, inimitable, and
require organizational support), typically to poli-
cies leveraging the value (V) of a firm’s work-
force (Koch and McGrath, 1996) and increasing
the inimitability (I) of human resources (HR) by
increasing employee retention (Perry-Smith and
Blum, 2000).1
However, many actions taken by firms do not
seem to affect their financial performance much,
1 For example, by encouraging and rewarding feedback from
lower ranked employees a firm can achieve superior market
knowledge. Similarly, providing long-term financial incentives
aligns executives’ incentives with shareholder goals, both of
which will help a firm get the most out of its employees (raising
V). Conversely, giving employees the option to scale down their
working hours, or offering childcare support within the firm, can
help a firm in retaining valuable employees (increasing I) without
necessarily increasing their productivity.
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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which led scholars to widen the definition of firm
performance to include corporate social perfor-
mance (Brammer and Millington, 2008; David,
Bloom, and Hillman, 2007) or environmental
response (Murillo-Luna, Garce´s-Ayerbe, and
Rivera-Torres, 2008), and to consider antecedents
of actions affecting other performance dimensions
(Young, Charns, and Shortell, 2001; Murillo-Luna
et al., 2008; Coombs and Gilley, 2005). Generally
speaking, the link between nonfinancial stake-
holder demands and firm actions suggests that
firms consider multiple factors when choosing their
actions. From a strategic perspective, what is espe-
cially interesting is whether actions influenced by
nonfinancial stakeholders are detrimental to firm
financial performance (i.e., if they are inconsis-
tent with firms maximizing profits), or whether
they complement other policies in making firm
resources valuable, rare, and inimitable.
The management of human capital plays a cru-
cial role in this line of research (Conner and Pra-
halad, 1996). On the one hand, the link between
employees and performance seems obvious, but
many strategies designed to improve workforce
productivity are only expected to translate into
‘hard’ performance measures like firm value
(Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000; Arthur, 2003;
Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Edmans, 2007) or
accounting profits (Huselid, 1995; Huselid, Jack-
son, and Schuler, 1997) through ‘soft’ channels
like organizational commitment (Lee and Miller,
1999; Eaton, 2003) or employee turnover (Guthrie,
2001; Huselid, 1995). On the other hand, the rea-
sons for implementing certain employee-friendly
practices are not clear-cut, as employees are an
input factor as well as a stakeholder group. This
is especially salient for family-friendly workplace
practices (FFWP), which do not directly affect
the workplace, but rather enhance the ability of
employees to combine working and personal life.
Nevertheless, prior work looking at the association
between FFWP and firm performance (Perry-Smith
and Bloom, 2000; Gray and Tudball, 2003; Mil-
liken, Martins, and Morgan, 1998) has generally
found a positive association whether performance
was measured in terms of work attitudes (Kossek
and Ozeki, 1998; Lobel, 1999; Van Yperen and
Hagedoorn, 2003), organizational citizenship
(Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Schnake, 1991;
Smith, Organ, and Near, 1983), or even firm
productivity (Konrad and Mangel, 2000; George,
2005; Collins and Clark, 2003).
The positive link between FFWP and perfor-
mance may be problematic for several reasons.
First, FFWP may simply be part of a wider set
of management practices found in well-performing
firms. If a well-managed firm uses a number
of performance-enhancing management practices
and concurrently uses FFWP, omitting the set of
other practices in performance regressions cre-
ates a spurious correlation between FFWP and
performance, a so-called ‘false positive.’2 Second,
while the provision of FFWP may improve morale
and employee retention, the link between FFWP
and a set of hard performance measures is more
controversial and has to be studied rigorously. For
example, employee retention may improve after
FFWP are introduced, but there may be costs
of production inflexibility reducing productivity
or costs of implementation reducing profitability.
Third, the FFWP-performance link may not give
a conclusive picture because firms may provide
FFWP for reasons other than enhancing finan-
cial performance. FFWP provision may be due to
firm characteristics unrelated to firm performance,
which would be ignored in a narrowly defined
study on FFWP and performance.
Further, a positive overall assessment of FFWP,
if confirmed, would leave us with a puzzle: if
FFWP were unambiguously good for firm perfor-
mance, all firms should introduce them on their
own accord (which they do not). One potential
explanation is that FFWP carry significant costs
of implementation borne by the firms while the
returns accrue to both firms and workers, which
creates a divergence of private and public returns
and the resulting underinvestment (or underprovi-
sion) problem. Another explanation is that firms
do not know the extent of benefits of FFWP, and
therefore prefer to delay introducing them until
they know more about them (Bryson et al., 2007).
A third is that firms have differing benefits from
FFWP and therefore some choose to adopt them,
while it is not profitable for others to do so due to
their employee base (Konrad and Mangel, 2000;
Gray and Tudball, 2003) or their strategy (De Cieri
et al., 2005; Becker, Huselid, and Ulrich, 1996). A
fourth possible reason for this puzzle is that firms
have different preferences regarding the balance of
2 Carmeli and Tishler (2004) show that including intangible orga-
nizational characteristics in performance regressions can help
explain considerable performance differences between
organizations.
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 343–367 (2011)
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their employees’ well-being and the financial per-
formance of the firm. This weighting is influenced
both by internal and external circumstances of the
firm (Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000; Brammer and
Millington, 2008).
There has been little or no research that distin-
guishes among these factors and gives an expla-
nation for the differential use of FFWP. In this
paper, we study two connected aspects related to
the strategic use of FFWP. First, we investigate the
‘effect’ of FFWP on firm performance measured
in multiple ways while controlling for multiple
factors, including the quality of management prac-
tices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010b).3 This
imposes more stringent conditions on identifying
FFWP as a bundle of activities constituting a firm
resource (Koch and McGrath, 1996; Perry-Smith
and Blum, 2000). Second, we study ‘determinants’
of FFWP. That is, we look for differences in firm
characteristics and external circumstances affect-
ing firms’ propensity to implement FFWP (Konrad
and Mangel, 2000; Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000).
Specifically, we ask two key questions:
i) Are FFWP positively correlated to firm perfor-
mance?
ii) Which firms are likely to adopt FFWP?
The first question studies the FFWP-firm per-
formance link. While the direction of causality
is difficult to establish in cross-sectional data, we
subject the claim of a positive correlation between
FFWP and firm performance to a rigorous analysis,
running a large number of robustness tests with dif-
ferent measures of our dependent and independent
variables. In particular, we control for the quality
of management practices, thus presenting a more
rigorous test of FFWP as a firm resource (Arend,
2006). The strategic implications of a possible
positive FFWP-performance link are clear: firms
will have to offer FFWP on top of other favor-
able management practices if they want to improve
performance. The second question addresses the
apparent puzzle that if FFWP are a universally
desirable policy, why do not all firms adopt them?
We study a set of firm characteristics that may
affect the propensity of adopting such practices,
either because FFWP are in higher demand or
3 Note that we will use ‘performance’ to indicate a firm’s
financial performance unless noted otherwise.
because they are cheaper to provide in firms with
certain characteristics.
Using a novel survey tool on the provision
of FFWP as well as management practices and
matching this data with detailed information on
firm financial performance, we address two com-
mon problems in testing for firm resources (Arend,
2006; Newbert, 2007): first, the confirmatory bias
arising from omitting other performance-enhancing
resources, and second, the problems associated
with using narrow performance measures. We thus
believe that our study gives a nuanced picture of
the provision and impact of FFWP and its validity
as a firm resource.
We surveyed over 450 firms in Europe (Ger-
many, France, and the United Kingdom) and
the United States to gather data on firm perfor-
mance, management, and FFWP, and uncovered
a number of surprising results. First, we found
that, contrary to much of the existing literature
on FFWP, the positive association between firm
performance and FFWP disappears once controls
for management practices are included. This sug-
gests that some of the earlier results on the pos-
itive performance impact of FFWP (Batt, 2002;
Fey et al., 2000; Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000;
Gray and Tudball, 2003; Milliken et al., 1998)
may be due in part to omitted variable bias, as
these studies do not control adequately for man-
agement quality. This calls for recasting FFWP
as a nonmarket strategy affecting outcomes other
than financial performance. Second, we find that
‘external’ factors like the gender and skills com-
position of the workforce and the overall quality
of management play an important role in FFWP
provision.
Our paper is structured as follows: in the next
section, we introduce a general framework for
the provision of FFWP and their impact on firm
performance. We then derive testable hypotheses
on the impact and determinants of FFWP before
we give a detailed discussion of our dataset and
the procedures used to collect it. We subsequently
present and discuss our results, and finally provide
concluding comments.
A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Although FFWP are often considered part of high-
performance HR strategy and good management in
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 343–367 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
346 N. Bloom, T. Kretschmer, and J. Van Reenen
Table 1a. Variable definitions
FFWP variables
FFWP score Composite z-score of hours worked, holidays taken, childcare flexibility,
working from home, job switching, job sharing, and childcare subsidy.
Total hrs/week Total hours worked per week, averaged and weighted over managerial and
non-managerial staff.
Mgmt hrs/week Total hours worked per week, managerial staff only.
Non-mgmt hrs/week Total hours worked per week, non-managerial staff only.
Holidays/year Days of holidays taken per year, averaged and weighted over managerial and
non-managerial staff.
Childcare flexibility Degree of flexibility in case of unexpected childcare emergency.
Childcare subsidy Presence of subsidy to help pay for childcare.
Working from home Entitlement to working from home during normal working hours.
Job switching Entitlement to switch from full-time to part-time work.
Job sharing Entitlement to job sharing schemes.
Output/performance variables
ROCE Return on capital employed.
Ln(S) (Natural) log of sales.
Ln(L) (Natural) log of employees.
Ln(K) (Natural) log of capital.
Ln(M) (Natural) log of material costs.
Ln(S/L) (Natural) log of sales per employee.
Ln(K/L) (Natural) log of capital per employee.
Ln(M/L) (Natural) log of material costs per employee.
Firm characteristics
Skills (Natural) log of percent of employees with university degree.
Female total Percentage of female employees as part of total workforce.
Female mngrs Percentage of female managers as part of management layer.
Mgmt Composite z-score of management questions.
Industry characteristics
ImPen (Natural) log of average imports/production by country/SIC pair for
1995–1999 (= import penetration).
Lerner index 1 − (average rents of all other firms in the industry, 1995–1999).
Competitors = 0 if none, = 1 if less than five, = 2 if five or more.
general, the first-order effect of FFWP is to ‘pro-
vide relief for non work concerns’ (Perry-Smith
and Blum, 2000: 1108). To conceptualize this,
we separate FFWP and a set of ‘good’ manage-
ment practices shown to improve firm productivity.
Consider a simple approach of characterizing the
effects of good management and FFWP:
w = f (X,M,D) (1)
y = g(X,M,D) (2)
where w = work-life balance outcomes and y =
performance outcomes (such as productivity or
profitability). X is an index of FFWP (such as
child/family care flexibility and subsidy—a com-
plete list is given in Table 1a), and M is an
index of good management practices (such as bet-
ter shop floor operations like lean manufacturing,
sensible targets, and merit-based promotion pro-
cedures—see the section on scoring FFWP and
management practices below). We model these
as being composite measures of several underly-
ing practices, so that X = x(X1 , X2 , X3 , . . .) and
M = m(M1 ,M2 ,M3 , . . .), where X1 , X2 , X3 . . .
are FFWP and M1 ,M2 ,M3 . . . are different
management ‘best practices.’ The x(.) and m(.)
are non-decreasing functions of the arguments.
Finally, D is a vector of control variables. Note
that we consider work-life balance an ‘outcome’
and FFWP an ‘input.’
We expect better management practices to be
associated with better performance: ∂y/∂M ≥ 0 .
We also expect more available family-friendly
policies to be associated with improved work-life
balance outcomes, that is, ∂w/∂X ≥ 0 (Kossek
and Ozeki, 1998; Lobel, 1999; Van Yperen and
Hagedoorn, 2003; Organ and Konovsky, 1989;
Schnake, 1991; Smith et al., 1983). In Appendix
A1, we confirm this using a measure of self-
reported work-life balance. The focus of this
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 343–367 (2011)
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study, however, is on the role of FFWP (‘X’)
in Equation (2), especially ∂y/∂X, the conditional
association of FFWP with performance. If FFWP
are implemented predominantly to improve work-
ers’ well-being rather than to improve firm perfor-
mance, we expect ∂y/∂X ≤ 0 , so that there is no
positive association between more FFWP provided
by the firm and superior performance. Firms may
then still implement FFWP because ∂w/∂X ≥ 0
(i.e., more FFWP imply better work-life balance)
and they care about workers’ well-being as well
as financial performance. This could be due to the
firm owners’ preferences, labor unions, or because
of regulatory pressures. If FFWP help make human
capital a more valuable or more inimitable firm
resource by helping employees work more pro-
ductively or help the firm retain talented staff, we
expect ∂y/∂X ≥ 0 , that is, better FFWP are posi-
tively correlated with performance.4
We also consider the drivers of FFWP provision.
Consider a set of factors Z = (Z1 , Z2 , Z3 , . . .) that
may affect these practices. These factors can be
internal or external to the firm and may proxy for
pressure by nonfinancial stakeholders to implement
certain organizational strategies such as FFWP.
We therefore model FFWP as a function of these
factors:
X = h(Z,D) (3)
Especially in the context of internal factors and
characteristics, this allows for a simple test if
FFWP provision is used to increase the value of a
resource: if an interaction term between X (FFWP)
and a factor Zi (say, the proportion of skilled
employees) is positive in Equation (2), this would
indicate that Zi is a valuable resource that is made
more effective by providing favorable FFWP. We
investigate this in more detail when we discuss our
regression results.
This framework is useful for a number of rea-
sons. First, we can separate the effects of firm and
environmental characteristics on FFWP and per-
formance. Second, we can draw some conclusions
about why firms provide FFWP. If there is a nega-
tive, or zero, correlation between FFWP provision
and firm performance, FFWP may be provided
because firms take other factors (like employee
4 Note, however, that a simple positive relationship does not
imply that FFWP are a valuable, rare, and inimitable firm
resource. To confirm this, a more stringent test would be required
(Arend, 2006; Newbert, 2007).
well-being or corporate social responsibility) into
account or because firm characteristics or circum-
stances dictate the implementation of FFWP.
In the following section, we derive hypotheses
on the correlation between FFWP and performance
(Hypothesis 1) and on the determinants of FFWP
(Hypotheses 2–5).
HYPOTHESES
Uncovering the FFWP-performance link
We first derive our hypothesis on the link between
FFWP and firm performance. The management of
human capital and its link to firm performance
has generated significant academic interest (Con-
ner and Prahalad, 1996). SHRM more generally
(Cappelli and Singh, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Ulrich,
1991; Wright and McMahan, 1992; Huselid, 1995)
and high-commitment workplace practices specif-
ically have been studied in much detail (Perry-
Smith and Blum, 2000; Arthur, 2003; Delaney
and Huselid, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Huselid et al.,
1997; Lee and Miller, 1999; Eaton, 2003; Guthrie,
2001), and a subset of these looks at the impact
of family-friendly policies on firm performance
(Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000; Gray and Tudball,
2003; Milliken et al., 1998). Using a number of
different performance measures such as work atti-
tudes (Kossek and Ozeki, 1998; Lobel, 1999; Van
Yperen and Hagedoorn, 2003), organizational cit-
izenship (Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Schnake,
1991; Smith et al., 1983), and firm productivity
(George, 2005; Collins and Clark, 2003), the liter-
ature is united in their view that FFWP positively
affect firm performance, which is summarized in
our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association
between more FFWP and firm performance.
To accurately capture the performance effects
of FFWP, however, we have to control for fac-
tors that may be correlated both with FFWP and
performance and may therefore generate spurious
correlation if omitted. To avoid this problem and
following Equation (2), we include a set of man-
agement practices that have previously been shown
to be positively correlated with firm performance.
We outline this approach in more detail when we
discuss our results.
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Determinants of FFWP provision
In the following four hypotheses, we identify a
number of covariates Z1 , Z2 , Z3 . . . in
Equation (3).
Workers’ skill levels
The literature on SHRM emphasizes the impor-
tance of a highly qualified workforce as a factor
for competitive advantage (Pfeffer, 1994; Wright,
McMahan, and McWilliams, 1994; Greenhaus and
Parasuraman, 1999; Lobel, 1999). Training and
development of firm-specific knowledge make
skilled workers a scarce resource for the firm
(Legge, 1998; Snell and Dean, 1992; Kleiner et al.,
1987; Terpstra and Rozell, 1993) as their knowl-
edge would not be easily replaceable (Barney,
1991; Wright and McMahan, 1992; Wright et al.,
1994; Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Since college-
educated workers are more likely to receive such
training, they may be able to extract a larger part
of the firm’s quasi-rents (Freidson, 1970; Raelin,
1986). While part of these rents will be distributed
by way of higher salaries, highly skilled workers
may also demand more FFWP as a result of their
bargaining position (Osterman, 1995). We there-
fore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher proportion of
skilled employees offer more FFWP.
Female participation
The majority of family and caring duties are ful-
filled by women (Shelton and John, 1996; Green-
haus and Parasuraman, 1999; Abbott, De Cieri,
and Iverson, 1998; Borrill and Kidd, 1994; Judge,
Boudreau, and Bretz, 1994; Konrad and Mangel,
2000), and FFWP are affected by the proportion
of employees likely to take them up when offered.
We expect the proportion of female employees to
affect the provision of FFWP for two related rea-
sons: First, female employees may demand more
favorable FFWP at their workplace (Konrad and
Mangel, 2000; De Cieri et al., 2005), which makes
it advantageous and/or necessary for a firm to pro-
vide them. Note that this is irrespective of whether
FFWP affect performance or not. Following our
basic model introduced in our general framework,
Equation (2) allows for other motivations such as
employee work-life balance to guide FFWP pro-
vision. Assuming that women demand and benefit
relatively more from FFWP than men, it would
simply be a case of enhancing work-life balance
for a large proportion of a firm’s employees. Sec-
ond, the female employees best placed to imple-
ment improvements in FFWP are managers (Harel,
Tzafrir, and Baruch, 2003; Harrigan, 1981; Daily,
Certo, and Dalton, 1999). Managers are also likely
to be in a better bargaining position to negotiate
practices beneficial to their own well-being. Both
these factors imply that, irrespective of the overall
proportion of female employees, a higher propor-
tion of female managers will be associated with
more favorable FFWP (Goodstein, 1994, 1995;
Ingram and Simons, 1995). In other words, we
expect female managers to be associated with more
FFWP, not only because they are likely to be con-
sidered ‘important’ employees by top management
but also because they are more likely to overcome
resistance by top management to implement these
practices. We summarize our hypotheses on the
role of female employees, particularly managers,
on FFWP as follows:
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with a higher proportion
of female employees offer more FFWP.
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a higher proportion
of female managers offer more FFWP.
Management practices
We argued that good management and a multi-
tude of FFWP offered fulfill different roles for the
firm. For example, use of ‘total quality manage-
ment’ (Young et al., 2001), bundles of HR prac-
tices (Huselid, 1995), and specific practices like
mentoring (Ragins, Cotton, and Miller, 2000), as
well as use of FFWP may simply be signs that
an organization can effectively meet the needs of
different stakeholders—investors, employees, or
even society as a whole (Brammer and Milling-
ton, 2008; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; David et al.,
2007). This may be either because the decision
makers within an organization have the skills and
abilities to successfully implement firm practices
benefiting any group of stakeholders, or because
there is a financial incentive for management to
implement them (Coombs and Gilley, 2005). Fur-
ther, if both good management in general and
FFWP specifically contribute to resource building
as argued above (Barney, 1991), we would expect
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both to occur jointly. We therefore hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 4: Firms with good management
practices offer more FFWP.
Competitive pressure
In addition to internal characteristics of the firm
associated with the provision of more FFWP, there
may also be external pressure to provide more
(or less) of these practices. The firm’s environ-
ment and pressure to focus on financial results is
expected to play a particularly important role. Such
pressures are likely to originate either from a firm’s
exposure to foreign competition or from deregu-
lation or other structural features of its primary
market. Previous work shows that the degree of
competition and other structural features of a firm’s
product market may affect the provision of HR
practices in general (Youndt et al., 1996; Koch and
McGrath, 1996; Datta, Guthrie, and Wright, 2005)
and FFWP in particular (Perry-Smith and Blum,
2000; Milliken et al., 1998), not least because pres-
sure on financial results demands practices like
long hours (De Cieri et al., 2005; Kirby and Krone,
2002; Nord et al., 2002; Smith, 1994; Wolcott
and Glezer, 1995), which are incompatible with a
wide range of FFWP in a firm (Ouchi, 1980; Tsui
et al., 1997; Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997; Gerhart
and Milkovich, 1992; Coff, 1997). Further, pre-
vious research has found that competitive pressure
forces firms to improve their management practices
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010b), which
suggests that underutilized resources or practices
delivering modest (if any) financial benefits will
be avoided. We summarize these arguments in the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Firms in more competitive prod-
uct markets offer less FFWP.
DATA AND PROCEDURES
To investigate these issues, we construct robust
measures of FFWP, work-life balance, manage-
ment practices, and our independent and control
variables across our four sampled countries (Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States). We first discuss the collection of FFWP,
work-life balance, and management data, which
was undertaken using an innovative firm survey
tool, and then the collection of performance data
and firm characteristics taken from more standard
firm and industry data sources. This data is also
freely available online to enable easy replication
of all results in the paper.5
Our variables are defined in Table 1a, and
descriptive statistics are in Table 1b. The sampling
procedure is detailed in Table A4 in the Appendix.
The correlation matrix is given in Table 1c.
Scoring FFWP and management practices
Measuring FFWP and management practices
requires codifying these concepts into something
applicable across different firms and countries.
This is difficult, as FFWP and good management
are hard to define. To do this, we combine con-
cepts that have been used previously, for example
in (i) the U.K. Workplace Employment Relations
Survey (WERS), (ii) a management practice eval-
uation tool developed by a leading international
management consultancy, and (iii) the prior man-
agement and economics literature. While our focus
here is on the determinants and consequences of
FFWP, we use good management practices as con-
trol variables in our performance regressions.
FFWP and work-life balance perceptions
In Appendix A3, we detail the HR interview guide
that was used to collect a range of detailed FFWP
and characteristics from firms. Focusing on the use
of voluntary FFWP, we minimize the influence of
different regulatory regimes on FFWP provision.
We collected three types of data:
• The first was managers’ perceptions on their
own firm’s work-life balance versus that of other
firms in the industry. This was used as our work-
life balance outcome measure (WLB), defined as
the response to the question: ‘Relative to other
companies in your industry, how much does
your company emphasize work-life balance?’
scored as: much less (1); slightly less (2); the
same (3); slightly more (4); much more (5).
We use this variable to validate the claim that
∂w/∂X ≥ 0 , that is, FFWP are effective in
5 See http://www.stanford.edu/∼nbloom/SMJFiles.zip. Note that
anonymized data has been used to protect the identity of any
particular firm or manager.
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 343–367 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
352 N. Bloom, T. Kretschmer, and J. Van Reenen
Table 2. Correlations between FFWP scores
Baseline FFWP
score
Alternative 1 FFWP
score
Alternative 2 FFWP
score
FFWP factor
Baseline FFWP score 1
Alternative 1 FFWP score 0.881∗ 1
Alternative 2 FFWP score 0.764∗ 0.915∗ 1
FFWP factor 0.909∗ 0.647∗ 0.482∗ 1
Notes:
• Starred coefficients (∗ ) significant at the 5% level.
• Baseline FFWP score is the double-z-score (see Equation (5)) of hours worked, holidays taken, childcare flexibility, working from
home, job switching, job sharing, and childcare subsidy.
• Alternative 1 FFWP score is the double-z-score of childcare flexibility, working from home, job switching, job sharing, and
childcare subsidy, that is, the baseline FFWP score without hours worked and holidays taken.
• Alternative 2 FFWP score is the double-z-score of childcare flexibility, working from home, job switching, and job sharing, i.e.
the baseline FFWP without hours worked, holidays taken, and childcare subsidy (childcare subsidy is mandatory for some firms
in our sample).
• FFWP factor is the highest-loading factor in a factor analysis of individual z-scores (see Equation (4)) of average hours worked,
average holidays taken, childcare flexibility, working from home, job switching, job sharing, and childcare subsidy.
terms of improving perceived employee work-
life balance.
• The second was data on key FFWP variables
including childcare flexibility, home working
entitlements, part-time to full-time job flexibil-
ity, job sharing schemes, and childcare subsidy
schemes. This was gathered by asking the fol-
lowing question on childcare flexibility: ‘How
much flexibility is there if an employee needed
to take a day off at short notice due to childcare
problems or their child was sick?’ and entitle-
ments to ‘working at home in normal working
hours,’ ‘switching from full-time to part-time
work,’ ‘job sharing schemes,’ and ‘financial sub-
sidy to help pay for childcare.’6
• The third was workforce characteristics data
on variables including average employee age,
hours, holidays, and the proportion of female
employees, plus information on skills (the pro-
portion of college-educated), trainings, and
unionization. This data was used to test our
hypotheses on the internal determinants of
FFWP.
6 Note that our measure of FFWP provision does not measure
the actual take-up of these practices within the firm, which
depends on social and firm-wide norms (Drago and Wooden,
1992; Thompson, Beauvais, and Lyness, 1999) and personal and
family characteristics (Gray, 1989; Grover and Crooker, 1995;
Lobel, 1991). This is because we focus on the supply of FFWP
as a decision variable by firms. However, our FFWP score is
significantly positively correlated with self-reported work-life
balance in the firm, suggesting that FFWP are taken up to
improve firm work-life balance.
We subsequently constructed our FFWP mea-
sure as the composite z-score (see below) of all five
dimensions on FFWP as well as the hours worked
and holidays taken. Using alternative measures of
FFWP (see Table 2) gives similar results.
Management practices
We follow Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010b)
in our definition of good management practices.
They find that the external validity of their man-
agement score is high given its strong and posi-
tive correlation with firm performance.7 We group
management practices into four areas: ‘operations’
(three practices), ‘monitoring’ (five practices), ‘tar-
gets’ (five practices), and ‘incentives’ (five prac-
tices). The operations management section focuses
on the introduction of lean manufacturing tech-
niques, the documentation of process improve-
ments, and the rationale behind introductions of
improvements. The monitoring section focuses
on the tracking of the performance of individu-
als, reviewing performance (e.g., through regular
appraisals and job plans), and consequence man-
agement (e.g., making sure that plans are kept and
7 They also do survey re-rater tests by reinterviewing 10 percent
of the sample using different interviewers and interviewees
(different plant managers) in the same firm. They find these
independent surveys to be highly significantly correlated. For
example, the intrafirm correlation of the management scores for
the 64 firms interviewed repeatedly were correlated at 0.734 (p-
value of 0.001), suggesting the two different interviews were
providing broadly consistent information about firm practices.
See Bloom and Van Reenen (2010a) for details.
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appropriate sanctions and rewards are in place).
The targets section examines the type of targets
(whether goals are simply financial, or operational,
or more holistic), the realism of targets (stretching,
unrealistic, or nonbinding), the transparency of tar-
gets (simple or complex), and the range and inter-
connection of targets (e.g., whether they are given
consistently throughout the organization). Finally,
incentives (or people management) include pro-
motion criteria, pay and bonuses, and the fixing
or firing of bad performers, where best practice
is deemed to be an approach that gives strong
rewards for those with both ability and effort.
These practices are all ranked on a scale of 1–5.
The key step to scoring management practices
is the use of ‘double-blind’ surveys. The first
part of double-blind is that the survey was con-
ducted by telephone without telling managers they
were being scored. This enabled scoring to be
based on the interviewers’ evaluation of actual firm
practices, rather than the firms’ aspirations, man-
agers’ perceptions, or the interviewers’ impres-
sions. To run this blind scoring, we used open
questions (e.g., ‘Can you tell me how you pro-
mote your employees?’) rather than closed ones
(e.g., ‘Do you promote your employees on tenure
[yes/no]?’). These questions target actual prac-
tices and examples, with the discussion continu-
ing until the interviewer can accurately assess the
firm’s typical practices. In most cases, three or
four questions were needed to score each practice.
The survey was targeted at plant managers, who
are typically senior enough to have an overview
of management practices, but not so senior as
to be detached from day-to-day operations of the
enterprise.
The second part of double-blind is that the inter-
viewers did not know anything about the firms’
financial information or performance prior to the
interview. This was achieved by selecting medium-
sized manufacturing firms (who interviewers have
typically not heard of before) and by providing
only firm names and contact details (but no finan-
cial details) to the interviewers. The interviewers
were specially trained graduate students from top
European and U.S. business schools. All inter-
views were conducted in the respective manager’s
native language. Since each interviewer ran over
50 interviews on average, we could include inter-
viewer fixed effects in all specifications to address
potential concerns over inconsistent interpretation
of categorical responses.
Finally, detailed information was collected on
the interview process itself (number and type of
prior contacts before obtaining the interview, dura-
tion, local time of day, date, and day of the
week), the manager (gender, seniority, national-
ity, company and job tenure, internal and exter-
nal employment experience, and location), and the
interviewer (we include interviewer fixed effects,
time of day, and a subjective reliability score
assigned by the interviewer). Some of these sur-
vey controls are significantly informative about the
management score, and when we use these as con-
trols for interview noise in our estimations, the
coefficients on the management score and FFWP
typically increase, suggesting we are removing sur-
vey noise.
Obtaining interviews with managers
Interviews took about 50 minutes on average and
were run from a single U.K. site. Overall, we
obtained a high response rate of 54 percent, which
was achieved through four steps:
• First, the interview was introduced as ‘a piece
of work’8 without discussion of the firm’s finan-
cial position or company accounts, making it
relatively uncontroversial for managers to par-
ticipate. Interviewers did not discuss financials
in the interviews, both to maximize managers’
participation and to ensure our interviewers were
truly blind on the firm’s financial position.
• Second, questions were ordered to begin with
the least controversial (shop floor management)
and finish with the most controversial (pay,
promotions, and firings). The FFWP questions
were placed at the end of the interview to
ensure as much candor as possible in managers’
responses.
• Third, the performance of the interviewers was
monitored as was the proportion of interviews
achieved, so interviewers were persistent in
chasing firms (the median number of contacts
each interviewer had per interview was 6.4). The
questions are also about practices within the firm
that any plant manager can respond to, so there
were potentially several managers per firm who
could be contacted.9
8 Words like ‘survey’ or ‘research’ were avoided, as these are
used by switchboards to block market research calls.
9 We found no significant correlation between the number, type,
and time span of contacts before an interview is conducted and
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• Fourth, written endorsements of the ‘Bundes-
bank’ (in Germany), the ‘Banque de France,’
and the ‘Treasury’ (in the United Kingdom)
helped demonstrate to managers that this was
an important exercise with official support.
Sampling frame and additional data
We focus on the manufacturing sector, where most
economists regard productivity as easier to mea-
sure than in the nonmanufacturing sector (see
Griliches [1994] for a discussion). Moreover, we
focused on medium-sized firms, selecting a sam-
ple where employment ranged between 50 and
10,000 workers (with a median of 700). Very small
firms have little publicly available data, so mea-
suring performance from public sources would be
difficult. On the other hand, very large firms are
likely to be more heterogeneous across plants, and
it would be difficult to get a representative pic-
ture of FFWP in the firm as a whole from just
one or two plant interviews. We drew a sampling
frame from each country to be representative of
medium-sized manufacturing firms, and then ran-
domly chose the order in which firms were con-
tacted (see Appendix A4 for details). We excluded
any clients of our partnering consultancy firm from
our sampling frame.
Comparing the responding firms with those in
the sampling frame, we found no evidence that
responders were systematically different from non-
responders on any of the performance measures.
They were also statistically similar on all other
observables in our dataset, except on size where
our firms were on average slightly larger than those
in the sampling frame.
Productivity and competition data
Quantitative information on firm sales, employ-
ment, capital, materials, and so forth came from
company accounts and proxy statements, and was
used to calculate firm-level labor and total factor
productivity and profitability. The details are pro-
vided in Appendix A4. To measure competition,
we follow Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005)
in using two broad measures. The first measure
the FFWP and management scores. This suggests that while
different managers may respond differently to the interview
proposition, this does not appear to be directly correlated with
their responses or firm management.
is obtained by calculating the three-digit indus-
try Lerner index of competition by country, which
is (1 − prof its/sales), calculated as the aver-
age across the entire firm-level database (exclud-
ing each firm itself).10 This is constructed for the
period 1995–1999 to remove any potential con-
temporaneous feedback. The second measure of
competition is the survey question on the number
of competitors a firm faces (see Appendix A3),
valued 0 for ‘no competitors,’ 1 for ‘less than five
competitors,’ and 2 for ‘five or more competitors.’
We also use three-digit import penetration of sales
to measure exposure to international competition.
RESULTS
Validation issues and descriptive statistics
Using FFWP z-scores
As mentioned above, we convert our survey
responses on FFWP into z-scores. That is, we
transform each firm’s response on a FFWP, Xi ,
as follows:
zi = Xi − Xi
σXi
(4)
By subtracting the sample mean of practice Xi
and dividing by the standard deviation, we elim-
inate problems of consistently different levels of
provision of specific practices. For example, if a
childcare subsidy is provided much less frequently
than childcare flexibility, a simple sum of the raw
FFWP scores would imply that an above average
score in a childcare subsidy may have the same
contribution to the composite score as a below
average score in childcare flexibility. Constructing
a z-score avoids these problems. From our indi-
vidual scores, we then construct a ‘double-z-score’
by summing all individual z-scores and performing
the same procedure on the sum, that is:
zzi =
∑
zi −
∑
zi
σ∑ zi
(5)
This lets us interpret the regression coefficients
intuitively—for example, a one unit change in an
10 Note that in constructing this measure we draw on all firms in
the population database, not just those in the survey.
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independent variable will lead to a change of zzi
standard deviations in the FFWP score.
Robustness of our FFWP score
Our measure of FFWP implies that there is a bun-
dle of FFWP that is comparable across our four
sampled countries that is affected in the same
way by our independent variables. However, dif-
ferent regulatory environments may imply that
some practices are more common in some coun-
tries than others. For example, hours worked are
affected in Germany and France by the EU Work-
ing Time Directive, limiting employees to a max-
imum of 48 hours per working week. To account
for this, we constructed a number of different
measures of FFWP, omitting and including prac-
tices that may differ systematically across coun-
tries. We also performed a factor analysis on our
individual practices’ z-scores and used the high-
est loading factor as an alternative FFWP score.
Table 2 gives the correlations between the respec-
tive FFWP scores.11
Descriptive statistics
The first issue we address is the association
between FFWP and perceived work-life balance.
In Appendix A1, we show that many individual
FFWP are significantly associated with the work-
life balance score reported by plant managers, and
that all signs go in the expected direction (i.e.,
negative for hours worked, positive for all others).
Most importantly, our aggregate z-score of FFWP
has a coefficient of 0.259 and is highly significant,
so that a one standard deviation improvement in
the FFWP score will be associated with a 0.259
improvement in self-reported work-life balance.
The second issue we examine in more detail is
the connection between our two composite vari-
ables, FFWP and management practices. As FFWP
are often regarded as part of strategic human
resource management, one might expect a posi-
tive correlation between FFWP and good manage-
ment practices. The regression results for individ-
ual management practices on our FFWP score are
reported in Appendix A2. We find that a number
of individual management practices are positively
and significantly associated with the provision of
11 We ran all regressions with our alternative FFWP scores with
no qualitative differences. Results are available on request.
FFWP. Most notably, when running our preferred
regression with all individual dimensions of man-
agement practices, we find that the incentives cate-
gory is significant and positive in our basic FFWP
regression. Thus, firms offering more FFWP also
have better people management practices, suggest-
ing that firms for which human capital is an impor-
tant resource tend to both treat and manage their
employees better.
Regression results—consequences of FFWP
In our first set of regressions, we focus on the
performance effects of FFWP. Our results on the
association of firm performance with FFWP are
given in Table 3.
Column (1) in Table 3 finds a positive associa-
tion between our FFWP score and a firm’s labor
productivity (i.e., sales per employee).12 This is
in line with a number of previous studies (Perry-
Smith and Blum, 2000; Gray and Tudball, 2003;
Milliken et al., 1998). However, in Column (2),
we find that once we control for the management
practices used in a firm, the coefficient’s magnitude
drops drastically and becomes completely insignif-
icant. This is in line with our Hypothesis 4 that
better run firms offer more FFWP. It does, how-
ever, suggest that omitting the set of management
practices typically found jointly with FFWP will
lead to spurious correlation between FFWP and
firm performance. Our remaining columns (3–8)
confirm this result: there seems to be no posi-
tive and significant correlation between FFWP and
firm performance when controlling for all inputs
(3) and measuring performance as a return on cap-
ital employed (5–8) once management practices
are controlled for. Allowing all production-related
coefficients to vary by country (Columns (4) and
(8)) does not change results either. Hypothesis 1,
therefore, finds no support in our regressions. Note
that an insignificant (or positive) result on our
narrow performance measure (sales per employee)
and a negative one on our broader measure (return
on capital employed [ROCE]) would have implied
that firms offering generous FFWP do not receive
the targeted benefits (through increased sales per
employee), but bear the cost of implementing
them (which would result in a negative correlation
between FFWP and ROCE). Our results suggest
that although there is no positive effect on labor
12 The coefficient’s p-value is 1.50.
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Table 3. FFWP and firm performance
Dependent variable (1)
Ln(S/L)
(2)
Ln(S/L)13
(3)
Ln(S/L)14
(4)
Ln(S/L)
(5)
Profits
(ROCE)
(6)
Profits
(ROCE)
(7)
Profits
(ROCE)
(8)
Profits
(ROCE)
FFWP score 0.048 0.018 −0.010 −0.008 −0.886 −1.095 −1.490 −1.599
Mgmt 0.093∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.913 1.104 1.124
Skills 0.019 0.022 1.156 1.194
Female total −0.001 −0.000 0.025 0.027
Ln(K/L) 0.118∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
Ln(M/L) 0.401∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
Ln(L) 0.023 2.286∗∗∗ 2.178∗∗∗ 3.576∗∗∗ 10.525
Ln(K) −1.807 −2.468
Ln(M) 0.631 −2.369
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
3-digit SIC dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard controls yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes
Full controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
Firms 483 483 438 438 432 432 425 425
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.257 0.737 0.765 0.169 0.170 0.165 0.216
Notes:
• All regressions (OLS) allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
• In all columns, ∗∗∗ = significant at the 1% level, ∗∗ = significant at the 5% level, and ∗ = significant at the 10% level.
• Variable definitions follow Table 1a.
• ROCE is the average taken over accounting years 2002–2005 to smooth out yearly variations.
• ‘Country dummies’ includes four country dummies.
• ‘3-digit SIC dummies’ includes 98 industry dummies.
• ‘Standard controls’ includes a dummy for public listings, the ln(age) of the firm, and a dummy for consolidated accounts.
• ‘Full controls’ includes the standard controls and the share of workforce with degrees, the share of female managers and
non-managers, the share of workforce with MBAs, and a U.S. MNE as well as a non-U.S. MNE dummy.
• Columns (4) and (8) include a set of country dummies interacted with ln(capital–labor ratio), ln(materials–labor ratio), and
ln(employment). The reported coefficients are the ones for the United Kingdom (the base country).
productivity, there is no negative one on profits
either, implying that FFWP pay for themselves.
This leaves the question of why firms imple-
ment FFWP if they have no apparent effect on
firm performance. One reason would be that some
key employees can (or will) work more produc-
tively if they are presented with a bundle of
FFWP. In other words, providing FFWP can help
turn certain groups of employees into a valuable
resource by improving retention or making them
work more productively. In this case, firms with
many FFWP and a large number of employees
who work more productively with more FFWP
13 Conditioning on the sample where total factor productivity
(rather than just labor productivity) can be measured gives the
same qualitative results.
14 Including Ln(L), that is, firm size in regressions (1)–(3) does
not change our results qualitatively. Ln(K) is insignificant with
a coefficient of 0.006 and a standard error of 0.653, suggest-
ing constant returns to scale. The coefficients on FFWP and
Mgmt are −0.011 (0.624) and 0.047 (0.002) in specification
(3) (standard errors in brackets).
should perform better. For example, an interaction
term between the percentage of female managers
or skilled employees and FFWP should then carry
a positive and significant sign in a performance
regression. We report our results with interaction
terms in Table 4 and find that none of the interac-
tion terms (with management, skills, or the propor-
tion of female managers) are significant, suggest-
ing that FFWP are not provided to keep valuable
groups of employees or motivate them to work
more productively.
A second possible explanation is that firms end
up implementing FFWP because a number of key
employees demand it and firms value the well-
being, and specifically the work-life balance, of
their employees as well as the financial perfor-
mance of the firm. This is consistent with our
model presented in our general framework, where
two processes generate two outputs—work-life
balance and financial performance. Note that in all
our regressions, the use of performance enhanc-
ing management practices is positively correlated
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Table 5. Determinants of FFWP
Dependent variable (1)
FFWP
score
(2)
FFWP
score
(3)
FFWP
score
(4)
FFWP
score15
(5)
FFWP
score
(6)
FFWP
score
(7)
FFWP
Score
(8)
FFWP
score16
Skills 0.117∗∗ 0.082
Female total 0.003
Female mngrs 0.005∗ 0.005∗
Mgmt 0.153∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
ImPen −0.130 −0.125
Lerner Index 0.811 0.282
Competitors −0.017 −0.062
Ln(L) 0.092 0.074 0.074 0.093 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.087
Ln(K) 0.011 0.030 0.025 −0.013 0.019 0.020 0.018 −0.012
Country
dummies
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
3-digit SIC
dummies
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firms 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.535 0.539 0.554 0.535 0.534 0.533 0.558
Notes:
• All regressions (OLS) allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
• In all columns, ∗∗∗ = significant at the 1% level, ∗∗ = significant at the 5% level, and ∗ = significant at the 10% level.
• Variable definitions follow Table 1a.
• ‘Country dummies’ includes four country dummies.
• ‘3-digit SIC dummies’ includes 98 industry dummies.
• ‘Standard controls’ includes a dummy for public listings, the ln(age) of the firm, and a dummy for consolidated accounts.
to FFWP provision. That is, although FFWP alone
do not have a tangible effect on firm performance,
it is still the well-managed firms that implement
them more readily.
Finally, it may be that firms are optimally choos-
ing the correct degree of FFWP for their firms,
so there is no systematic variation to identify
the performance equations. If there were no opti-
mization errors, no exogenous shocks, and no
adjustment costs, we could not identify the coef-
ficient of FFWP on performance, even if one
existed. Although this is possible theoretically, it is
unlikely to be the whole story in empirical practice.
15 The positive and significant coefficient on management quality
is robust to including a number of noise controls pertaining
to the interview process, including interviewer dummies, the
seniority, gender, tenure, and number of countries worked in of
the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview
was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted,
the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability
of the information as coded by the interviewer.
16 The total percentage of female employees was omitted due to
the high degree of colinearity between the total percentage and
the percentage of female managers. Coefficients and significance
of the other variables remain virtually unaffected by the inclusion
of the total percentage of female employees.
Regression results—determinants of FFWP
We now turn to our regressions on the determi-
nants of FFWP provision. Our results are given in
Table 5.
We can see from Table 5 that the proportion of
skilled employees has a robust positive association
with the provision of FFWP. Column (1) uses
basic controls only, while Column (8) includes all
variables of interest. We find that although the level
of significance decreases once management and the
proportion of female managers are included,17 the
coefficient is consistently positive. Hypothesis 2 is,
therefore, broadly supported.
The percentage of female managers is also posi-
tively and significantly correlated with FFWP pro-
vision in Columns (3) and (8). The overall pro-
portion of female employees is not significant
as seen in Column (2), which suggests a com-
plex relationship between female employees and
FFWP provision. It is not simply the proportion
17 Omitting either the proportion of female managers or manage-
ment results in a significant coefficient on skills, which is not
surprising as using all three internal variables simultaneously
may cause colinearity problems.
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of female employees that results in provision of
FFWP. Rather, it is the presence of a group of
key employees—female managers—that places a
comparably higher value on more FFWP in an
organization. There are at least two possible inter-
pretations of this. Either, female managers nego-
tiate a bundle of advantageous FFWP when in
the firm (bargaining effect), or they choose to
work only for firms that provide sufficiently gener-
ous FFWP (self-selection effect). As always with
cross-sectional data, the direction of causality is
hard to establish, but the positive coefficient of the
proportion of female managers on FFWP is robust
and significant, suggesting tangible differences in
FFWP policies among firms with different gender
workforce composition. We therefore find support
for Hypothesis 3b, but not Hypothesis 3a.
The final variable relating to the internal char-
acteristics of the workplace are the management
practices in a firm. In all our regressions, the coeffi-
cient on good management practices is positive and
highly significant—see Columns (4) and (8). This
suggests that well-run firms offer their employ-
ees more FFWP. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 on the
concurrent use of good management practices and
advantageous FFWP is supported. However, as
shown above, FFWP have no independent effect
on financial performance.
Our hypotheses on external determinants of
FFWP are tested in Columns (5)–(8) of Table 5.
We find that import penetration (5) and the gen-
eral degree of competition in an industry (Columns
(6) and (7)) are not associated with more or less
FFWP. In our regression with all covariates (8),
the external determinants remain insignificant. The
rejection of Hypothesis 5 is in contrast to the
strong support of our earlier hypotheses on inter-
nal determinants of FFWP. It suggests that external
pressure to provide or abandon FFWP is not as
significant as the influence of factors at the work-
place itself—either through the composition of the
workforce (i.e., more skilled workers and more
female managers) or the general use of good man-
agement practices. Further, our results also suggest
that firms operating in tough product markets try
to cope with the situation by means other than
reducing the number of FFWP available to their
employees. This is especially interesting as these
product market competition variables have been
found to be strongly correlated with good man-
agement practices.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we studied the impact of FFWP on
firm performance and found that increased provi-
sion of FFWP is only positively correlated with
better firm performance if we omit management
quality. Once we control for general manage-
ment quality, there is no significant association
between FFWP and performance measured in dif-
ferent ways. This raises the question of why firms
would want to implement them in the first place.
To investigate this, we studied the firm and envi-
ronmental characteristics that are correlated with
increased FFWP use, and find that firms with a
higher proportion of skilled workers and female
managers, as well as better management prac-
tices offer more FFWP. One interpretation of this
is that firms must offer FFWP to avoid losing
key employees, which may constitute a valuable
resource for the firm. In further analysis, however,
we find that this is unlikely to be a driving factor
for FFWP provision, as firms with more female
managers or skilled workers do not benefit more
from FFWP than others. Instead, our results are
consistent with firms valuing more than just finan-
cial performance when choosing their strategies.
This resonates with the recent work on corpo-
rate social responsibility (Brammer and Milling-
ton, 2008; David et al., 2007) and environmental
sustainability (Murillo-Luna et al., 2008).
Our ‘non-results’ on the performance impact of
FFWP combined with the results on the inter-
nal determinants of FFWP use have implications
for resource-based view (RBV) scholars, espe-
cially those interested in human capital as a firm
resource. Our findings suggest that FFWP bun-
dles are not a general ‘best practice’ that improves
firm performance in the sense of a firm capabil-
ity or resource. There is also no indication that
FFWP help firms create more value from specific
employee groups, specifically female managers
and skilled workers. Rather, our results support
the conclusion that FFWP are neither a value-
creating bundle of activities nor a lever for existing
resources—they do not affect firm performance
directly or indirectly. While explicit tests of the
RBV are difficult to execute (Arend, 2006; New-
bert, 2007), our results do not suffer from con-
firmatory bias arising from tautological resource
definitions and narrow performance measures
ignoring costs, as we consider both productivity
© 2010 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 32: 343–367 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
360 N. Bloom, T. Kretschmer, and J. Van Reenen
(that ignores implementation costs) and profit mea-
sures (that includes them). A more rigorous test
of FFWP as a firm resource would have to meet
additional criteria (Arend, 2006), but these criteria
mainly rule out false positives, that is, activities
that are identified as resources but really are not.
Indeed, earlier studies may have attributed FFWP a
false positive impact by failing to control for other
VRIO resources (Arend, 2006) and by considering
restrictive performance measures, something our
comparatively more stringent test does not do.
One possible implication from the discussion
above is that FFWP have no role to play in organi-
zations that maximize financial performance. Note,
however, that the provision of FFWP is also not
negatively correlated with firm financial perfor-
mance. This rebuts the claim that providing FFWP
detracts from profits. Given the positive relation-
ship between the provision of FFWP and actual
work-life balance, our results show that although
providing FFWP may not increase profits, they at
least pay for themselves. If employees’ well-being
is tied to work-life balance, they can be made bet-
ter off with investors no worse off. The overall
provision of stakeholder desires is thus increased
with the provision of FFWP.
Our results have implications for future research
in several fields. Specifically, studies on the perfor-
mance effects of FFWP from a RBV perspective
should control for other dimensions of manage-
ment practices to reliably isolate the performance
effects of such practices, and thus identify their
value as a firm resource (Arend, 2006). ‘Intangi-
bles’ like managerial capabilities that affect per-
formance and are correlated with tangible firm
characteristics have to be taken into account in
future studies (Carmeli and Tishler, 2004). The
problem of unobservables is likely to resurface
in many studies trying to identify and evaluate
firm resources. Our results also matter for HR
managers and academics who group FFWP under
strategic human resource management alongside
a number of other, performance enhancing HR
practices. FFWP have implications different from
other strategic human resource management prac-
tices, as they affect employee well-being rather
than firm financial performance. FFWP should
not be criticized for their lack of positive finan-
cial impact, as they do have a tangible effect on
employee well-being. Therefore, FFWP should be
treated as policies that improve firm performance
in terms of the satisfaction of a particular stake-
holder group—the firm’s employees—but that
financial performance should not be the primary
goal of implementing FFWP. Our work also feeds
into a wider, emerging research field of nonmarket
strategies affecting auxiliary performance dimen-
sions. Researchers face a complex problem with
firms choosing strategies to serve multiple stake-
holders. Firm characteristics affect these strategic
actions in complex ways, and there may be inter-
actions between the different performance dimen-
sions that have to be identified empirically rather
than assumed (or ignored) a priori.
Our results carry some limitations. First, we
focus on manufacturing firms. We do this mainly
to avoid problems in measuring firm performance,
but it would be interesting to compare our results
with data from the service sector. Second, we do
not measure the degree to which FFWP are taken
up by employees. While this has some disadvan-
tages, it has the advantage of capturing the pro-
vision of FFWP rather than their take-up in the
workforce, which may be conflated with questions
of corporate culture, peer pressure, and so forth. In
other words, while provision of FFWP is a deci-
sion variable by the firm, take-up of FFWP will
at the very least be the result of a combination of
FFWP supply (by the firm) and demand (by its
employees). Third, we only sample firms with less
than 10,000 employees, so we lose the very largest
firms (although since we use subsidiaries, some of
the parents of our firms are very large). We do not
think this biases our results, but studying the very
largest firms would also be of interest.
Our work could be extended in several ways.
We used country dummies in all our regressions
and found significant differences in FFWP provi-
sion across our four sampled countries—Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.18 We do not discuss these results in detail,
but it is a promising avenue of future research to
study cross-country differences in FFWP scores
to find different international models of FFWP.
Further, the role of female managers in FFWP pro-
vision is interesting. Specifically, our result that it
18 The signs of our country dummies show that firms in European
countries offer significantly more FFWP than U.S.-based firms
after controlling for observables, while labor productivity in
Continental Europe tends to be higher after controlling for input
factors. Further results on the country dummy coefficients are
available on request.
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is not the overall proportion of female employ-
ees but rather the proportion of female managers
that matters warrants further study. Will female
managers not work for firms that do not provide
sufficient FFWP, or are they more successful in
‘pushing through’ the provision of such practices?
The well-known stylized fact that female man-
agers are paid less than their male peers19 suggests
that firms compensate their female workforce with
more FFWP. This is a highly relevant topic for
future research.
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APPENDIX A3: HR INTERVIEW GUIDE
Run in parallel as the management survey, but targeted at the HR department.
Workforce characteristics —data field Breakdown
Total number of employees (cross-check
against accounts)
(all employees)
Percentage with university degree (all employees)
Percentage with MBA (all employees)
Average age of employees (all employees)
Percentage of employees (managerial/non-managerial)
Average training days per year (managerial/non-managerial)
Average hours worked per week (incl.
overtime, excl. breaks)
(managerial/non-managerial)
Average holidays per year (all employees)
Average days sick leave (all employees)
Percentage part time (managerial/non-managerial)
Percentage female (managerial/non-managerial)
Percentage employees abroad (all employees)
Percentage union membership (all employees)
Are unions recognized for wages bargaining
[yes/no]
(all employees)
Work-life balance (WLB/outcome measure
—question
Response choice (all employees)
Relative to other companies in your industry,
how much does your company emphasize
work-life balance?
[much less; slightly less; the same; slightly more; much
more]
FFWP —question Response choice (managerial/non-managerial)
If an employee needed to take a day off at
short notice due to childcare problems or
their child was sick, how do they generally
do this?
[not allowed; never been asked; take as leave without
pay; take time off but make it up later; take as annual
leave; take as sick leave]
FFWP —what entitlements are there to the
following:
Breakdown
Working at home in normal working hours? (managerial/non-managerial)
Switching from full-time to part-time work? (managerial/non-managerial)
Job sharing schemes? (managerial/non-managerial)
Financial subsidy to help pay for childcare? (managerial/non-managerial)
Market and firm questions —question Response choice
Number of competitors? [none; less than five; five or more]
Number of hostile takeover bids in the last
three years?
[none; one; more than one]
Interviewer’s assessment of the scoring reliability— 1–5 scoring system calibrated according to:
1 = Interviewee did not have enough expertise for the interview to be valuable; I have significant doubts about
most of the management dimensions probed.
3 = Interviewee had reasonable expertise; on some dimensions, I am unsure of scoring.
5 = Interviewee had good expertise, I am confident that the score reflects management practices in this firm.
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APPENDIX A4: DATA
Sampling frame construction
Our sampling frame was based on the Amadeus
dataset for Europe (Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom) and the Compustat dataset for
the United States. These all have information on
company accounting data. We chose firms whose
principal industry was in manufacturing and who
employed (on average between the years 2000 and
2003) no less than 50 employees and no more than
10,000 employees. We also removed any clients
of the consultancy firm we worked with from the
sampling frame (33 out of 1,353 firms).
Our sampling frame is reasonably representa-
tive of medium-sized manufacturing firms. The
European firms in Amadeus include both private
and public firms, whereas Compustat only includes
publicly listed firms. There is no U.S. database
with privately listed firms with information on
sales, labor, and capital. Fortunately, there is a
much larger proportion of firms listed on the stock
exchange in the United States than in Europe, so
we were able to go substantially down the size dis-
tribution using Compustat. Nevertheless, the U.S.
firms in our sample are slightly larger than those of
the other countries, so we were always careful to
control for size and public listing in the analyses.
Another concern is that we conditioned on firms
where we have information on sales, employment,
and capital. These items are not compulsory for
firms below certain size thresholds, so disclosure
is voluntary to some extent for the smaller firms.
Luckily, the firms in our sampling frame (over
50 workers) are past the threshold for voluntary
disclosure (the only exception is for capital in
Germany).
We achieved a response rate of 54 percent from
the firms that we contacted: a very high success
rate given the voluntary nature of participation.
Respondents were not significantly more produc-
tive than nonresponders. French firms were slightly
less likely to respond than firms in the other three
countries, and all respondents seemed randomly
spread around our sampling frame.
Firm-level data
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment,
capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term debt,
market values (for quoted firms), and wages (where
available) came from Amadeus (Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom) and Compustat (United
States). For other data fields, we did the following:
Materials
In Germany and France, these are line items in
the accounts. In the United Kingdom, these were
constructed by deducting the total wage bill from
the cost of goods sold. In the United States, these
were constructed following the method in Bresna-
han, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002). We start with
costs of goods sold (COGS) less depreciation (DP)
less labor costs (XLR). For firms who do not report
labor expenditures, we use average wages and ben-
efits at the four-digit industry level (Bartelsman,
Becker, and Gray, 2000) until 1996, and then Cen-
sus Average Production Worker Annual Payroll by
four-digit NAICS code and multiply this by the
firm’s reported employment level. This constructed
measure is highly correlated at the industry level
with materials. Obviously, there may be problems
with this measure of materials (and therefore value
added), which is why we check robustness to mea-
sures without materials.
Industry-level data
This comes from the OECD STAN database of
industrial production. This is provided at the coun-
try ISIC Rev. 3 level and is mapped into U.S. SIC
(1997) three-digits (which is our common industry
definition in all four countries).
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